A Functional Response to International Crime: An International Justice Commission by Hussain, Farrah
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 70 
Number 4 Volume 70, Fall 1996, Number 4 Article 3 
March 2012 
A Functional Response to International Crime: An International 
Justice Commission 
Farrah Hussain 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Hussain, Farrah (1996) "A Functional Response to International Crime: An International Justice 
Commission," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 70 : No. 4 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol70/iss4/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
A FUNCTIONAL RESPONSE TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIME: AN
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE COMMISSION
Since the end of the Cold War and the consequent demise of
the bipolar order, international crime has been on the rise.' Due
to the lack of a central organization to enforce international law,
our society is wholly unequipped to deal with crime at the inter-
national level.' The United Nations was established in 1945 to
foster peaceful and cooperative relations among states.3 The
premise behind its creation was that collective security, shared
values, and cooperation were in the interest of every state.4 At
'See, e.g., Jose A. Baez, An International Crimes Court: Further Tales of the
King of Corinth, 23 GA. J. INVL & COMP. L. 289, 291 (1993) (noting continued threat
to international peace posed by growth in transnational and international crime).
International crime generally includes aggression, unlawful use of weapons, slavery,
genocide, racial discrimination, taking of hostages, terrorism, and drug offenses.
FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE MONOPOLIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
UNITED NATIONS: A JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACH 51-52 (2d ed. 1995).
2 See generally Rupa Bhattacharyya, Establishing a Rule-of-Law International
Criminal Justice System, 31 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 57, 62 (1996) (tracing history and de-
velopment of rule-of-law system for international criminal law while noting that no
such system has yet been established); Charles S. Saphos, Essay, Something Is Rot-
ten in the State of Affairs Between Nations: The Difficulties of Establishing the Rule
of International Criminal Law Because of Public Corruption, 19B FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1947, 1948 (1996) (discussing need to create international system to address
organized crime and drug trafficking).
3 U.N. CHARTER art. 1. The United Nations has been recognized as the primary
international organization for the maintenance of international peace. MALEKIAN,
supra note 1, at 1. The fundamental principles of the United Nations are formulated
in its Charter which was signed at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization on June 26, 1945, and which came into force on October 24, 1945. Id.
at 1 n.4. The law of the Charter is binding upon all United Nations members, and its
obligations may be enforced upon even non-member nations for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6. The
United Nations, however, has no authority to intervene in matters which are within
the domestic jurisdiction of the states. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
Article 7 of the United Nations Charter established six principal organs of the
U.N.: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the
Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1.
4 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1609, 1609 (1995); see 2 M. CHERIF
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that time, the primary threat to international peace was aggres-
sion by states against one another.5 Since then, however, there
has been a significant change in the international climate with
conflict erupting both within and among states.6 This global
destabilization has resulted in an upsurge in international
crime.7
Because international criminal law is still in its infancy and
is faced with a number of limitations,' it is not adequately
equipped to respond to the explosive growth of international
crimes Namely, international crime is not recognized by all
BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED STATES LAW & PRACTICE 625 (2d
ed. 1987) ("Since World War II, the peoples of the world have become more con-
scious than ever of the need to insure [sic] their collective safety and survival."). See
generally HANNA BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTER-
NATIONAL LEGISLATION (1978) (examining role United Nations plays in formulation
of international law); M.V. NAIDU, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(1974) (attributing concept of collective security as fundamental basis for creation of
United Nations).
5 Boutros-Ghali, supra note 4, at 1610. The bipolar system of the Cold War,
however, significantly reduced that threat and served to maintain an overall peace
among nations. Id.
6 Id.; see Madeleine K. Albright, International Law Approaches the Twenty-First
Century: A U.S. Perspective on Enforcement, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1595, 1597
(1995) (stressing difficulties in reacting to new, complex threats to international or-
der). As a result, the United Nations may now be taking on new roles of unprece-
dented significance. John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and In-
stitutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 535 (1993); see, e.g., Kelly A. Childers,
Comment, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan Wars and the Chang-
ing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold War World, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 117, 192-232 (1994) (discussing outbreak of wars in Balkans and use of United
Nations peace-keepers in conflict); Symposium, The Prospective Role of the United
Nations in Dealing with the International Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Period:
An Analysis in Light of the Persian Gulf Crisis, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 9 (1992)
(examining role of U.N. in Persian Gulf war).
7 See supra note 1 (discussing explosive growth in amount of international crime
since end of Cold War).
8 LEONARD J. HIPPCHEN & YONG S. YIM, TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL CRIME,
AND ARMS CONTROL 158 (1982); see id. at 13 ("Crime prevention at the international
level, although offering greater potential for long-run crime reduction, is yet in its
infancy."). The main goal of international criminal law is to protect the international
legal system by deterring crimes which may jeopardize the international legal order
and its peace. MALEKIAN, supra note 1, at 26. International criminal law, therefore,
is a body of law which works together with other areas of international law as well
as with domestic legal systems in all states to bring the perpetrators of interna-
tional or national crimes within the respective criminal jurisdiction. Id.
9 See HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 6 ("[Als mankind is being confronted
with new forms and dimensions of criminality, it is being discovered that crime con-
trol systems developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries no longer are
adequate to cope with these problems."); Barton & Carter, supra note 6, at 535
("International law and institutions have evolved rapidly since [World War III, but
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nations, and no central organization has been established to
monitor the enforcement of its rules.10 These impediments have
effectively crippled the enforcement of criminal law at the inter-
national level." Therefore, individual states are left to decide
the level and extent of domestic enforcement of international
crime.1
Owing to the lack of an international criminal legal system,
the burgeoning scope and high incidence of international crime
pose problems that require an immediate and functional inter-
national response. 3 Although drug trafficking and terrorism
remain the most serious international crimes,'4 other common
they have failed to keep pace with the changes in the world."); Boutros-Ghali, supra
note 4, at 1611 ("A new type of situation, found in today's conflicts, has spurred the
innovative development of jurisdictional measures beyond those envisioned for the
International Court of Justice."); see also Childers, supra note 6, at 134 (discussing
"U.N.'s inability to adapt its peace machinery to a set of tasks so fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of the past") (citations omitted).
'0 See HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 158 (discussing unresolved issues
which limit effectiveness of international law). "Neither general international law
nor the Charter of the United Nations obliges States to submit their disputes to
courts or arbitral bodies." Hermann Mosler, Problems and Tasks of International
Judicial and Arbitral Settlement of Disputes Fifty Years After the Founding of the
World Court, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 4 (1974); see
Helmut Steinberger, The International Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 193, 195-201 (discussing reservations of several coun-
tries concerning issue of compulsory jurisdiction of International Court of Justice).
Many contend that "although the Court cannot solve problems of a political nature,
or prevent the actual outbreak of war, the Court makes important contributions to
the peaceful coexistence of independent states." HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at
166.
Thus, "[e]xperienced observers of international relations are right when they
consistently note that the function of international law and of international juris-
diction in the area of the peaceful settlement of highly political disputes, and in
particular of disputes containing a threat to peace or international security [such as
international crime], is of necessity quite limited." Steinberger, supra, at 207.
"1 See William N. Gianaris, The New World Order and the Need for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 88, 105-08 (1992/93) (discussing in-
adequacies in current international criminal law system).
"MALEKIAN, supra note 1, at 28; see also Barton & Carter, supra note 6, at
540-41 (discussing "lack of bite" of International Court of Justice).
'S Gianaris, supra note 11, at 88; see HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 6 ("For
the past 10-20 years the world community has been faced with an increase in the
sophistication and organization of criminal activities...."); SIR LEON RADzINoWICz &
JOAN KING, THE GROWTH OF CRIME 3 (1977) ("The incidence [of crime] seems to be
going up in all parts of the world, whatever the stage of development and among all
segments of society....").
1 Experts often refer to these crimes as "multinational, systematic crimes."
JOHN M. MARTIN & ANNE T. ROMANO, MULTINATIONAL CRIME: TERRORISM,
ESPIONAGE, DRUG & ARMS TRAFFICKING 1, in Studies in Crime, Law, and Justice
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crimes such as murder, 5 rape, 6 kidnapping,' and white collar
crime 8 are quickly becoming more prevalent in the international
19
arena.
Vol. 9 1992. Multinational systematic crimes are crimes committed by various types
of organizations that operate across national boundaries and in more than one coun-
try simultaneously. Id. Each of these crimes is seen as a threat to a country's na-
tional security. Id.; see, e.g., Jill Smolowe, Reading the Coca Leaves: A Drug Case
Ensnares Top Officials and Raises Questions About What Castro Is Up To, TIME,
July 10, 1989, at 30 (discussing arrest of Major General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez and
six other military and Interior Ministry officials in Cuba for drug trafficking). As the
world becomes more economically, socially, and politically interdependent, multina-
tional crime systems become more expansive and more powerful. MARTIN &
ROMANO, supra, at 3.
"See generally Peter J. Vassalo, Note, The New Ivan the Terrible: Problems in
International Criminal Enforcement and the Spector of the Russian Mafia, 28 CASE
W. RES. J INTL L. 173, 181-82 (1996) (examining criminal enforcement problems
caused by "internationalization" of Mafia murder).
1'6 See generally Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humani-
tarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424 (1993).
1 See generally Susan L. Barone, International Parental Child Abduction: A
Global Dilemma With Limited Relief-Can Something More Be Done?, 8 N.Y. INT'L
L. REV. 95 (Summer 1995) (surveying recent cases involving international kidnap-
ping of children by parents during custody battles); Hernan De J. Ruiz-Bravo, Mon-
strous Decision: Kidnapping Is Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (1993)
(examining use of international kidnapping as means of circumventing extradition
by nations).
18 William H. Webster, An Examination of FBI Theory and Methodology Regard-
ing White-Collar Crime Investigation and Prevention, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 275, 275
(1980) ("[W]hite-collar crime has become one of law enforcement's greatest chal-
lenges .... "). See generally HAZEL CROALL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND CRIMINOLOGY (1992) (examining types of white collar crime and methods of en-
forcement); EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION
(1983) (defining and discussing white collar crime). White collar crime is fundamen-
tally different from the more traditional "street crimes" such as burglary, rape, and
homicide. See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting
White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT.
L. REv. 405, 406 (1993) (examining differences between white collar crime and
street crime and how differences affect successful enforcement). White collar crime
includes fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, price rigging, and double dealing in se-
curities. G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Consti-
tutional Theory or New Congressional Statutes, but the Exercise of Responsible
Prosecutive Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1189-90 (1995). See generally Hen-
ning, supra (comparing white collar and street crimes).
9 See Gianaris, supra note 11, at 89 (citing increase in nontraditional interna-
tional crime as reason behind creation of international criminal court); see also
HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 5 ("Fears concerning societal safety stem not only
from well-organized political terrorists and criminals, but also from quite unpredict-
able and randomly occurring street crimes, i.e. murder, assault, rape, robbery.");
Joel S. Solomon, Forming a More Secure Union: The Growing Problem of Organized
Crime in Europe as a Challenge to National Sovereignty, 13 DICK J. INT'L L. 623,
628-33 (1995) (analyzing increasing presence and power of organized crime in
Europe); Brian R. Allen, Comment, The Banking Confidentiality Laws of Luxem-
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Part I of this Note examines the ineffectiveness of the nu-
merous extradition treaties which make up the present system
used to address the new trend of international crime. Part II
discusses the proposal for an international criminal court and
the problems associated with such a tribunal. Finally, Part III
sets forth what appears to be the most workable solution: the
creation of an International Justice Commission.
I. TBE INEFFECTIVENESS OF EXTRADITION TREATIES: THE
PROBLEM OF "FORUM LIVING"
Absent a system of international criminal law, extradition
treaties are the sole means by which a state can gain jurisdiction
over an individual outside its borders whom it seeks to prosecute
for an alleged wrongdoing." As stated by the United States Su-
preme Court:
[T]he principles of international law recognize no right to ex-
tradition apart from treaty. While a government may, if agree-
able to its own constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the
power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the country from
which he has fled ... the legal right to demand his extradition
and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding
country exist only when created by treaty."'
Consequently, this process is so largely flawed as to render it
bourg and Bank of Credit & Commerce International: The Best Kept Secret in
Europe, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 73, 74 (1993) (discussing global nature of BCCI bank
scandal and need for reform of international bank secrecy laws).
International surveys of street crimes conducted by the United Nations show
that reported crime has increased annually at a rate of approximately two percent.
HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 6-7. Accordingly, it can be estimated that from
1970 to 1980, world street crime increased by approximately twenty percent. Id. at
7. Between 1970 and 1975, it was found that the greatest increase in crime was re-
ported for drug abuse (114%), robbery (179%), theft (46%), and homicide (20%). Id.
2' See M. CHERIF BAsSIOuNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 13 (1974) (tracing history of international extradition practices as well as
role extradition fills in modern international law). American extradition law defines
the process as:
A process by which, in accordance to treaty provisions and subject to its
limitations one state requests another to surrender a person charged with
a criminal violation of the laws of the requesting state who is within the
jurisdiction of the requested state, for the purposes of answering criminal
charges, stand trial or execute a sentence arising out of the stated criminal
violation.
Id. at 27(citations omitted).
2' Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (citations omitted); see
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886) (noting duty of extradition
between nations exists only in treaty).
1996]
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useless.
Extradition provides for the transfer of an accused person
from one nation to another so that such person may face criminal
charges.22 The premise behind extradition is that the accused
individual has affected an interest of the requesting state in
some way.23 Both treaties and principles of comity between na-
tions govern the extradition process.' These treaties, usually
bilateral agreements, "provide nations with a means to avoid
2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 47 ("The classical definition of extradition is
that it is a process by which one state (the state of refuge or asylum) surrenders to
another (the requesting state) an individual (the relator) accused or convicted in the
requesting state of an offense for which the requesting state is seeking to subject
the relator to trial or punishment.").
The conceptual framework of extradition, therefore, is based on five factors: the
recognition of the national interest of the states who are parties to the proceedings;
the existence of an international duty to preserve and maintain world order; the ef-
fective application of minimum standards of fairness and justice to the accused in
the extradition process; a collective duty on the part of all states to combat criminal
activity; and the balancing of these factors within the juridical framework of the
Rule of Law. Id. at 47.
2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 202. Prior to requesting the surrender of an in-
dividual, a state must determine if it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
alleged conduct, because the state of refuge will not entertain such a request unless
it finds that the requesting state has proper jurisdiction over the matter. See id. at
203. The rationale behind this requirement is that every state exercises jurisdiction
over all persons (i.e., nationals, resident aliens, associations) and objects within its
physical boundaries. Id. at 206. Thus, when a state requests the extradition of an
individual, it asserts that it has jurisdiction over the conduct allegedly performed by
the individual, it is a competent forum to prosecute the offender, and that when the
individual is extradited, he or she will be properly submitted to its judicial authori-
ties. Id. at 270. The act with which the fugitive is charged must be an extraditable
crime in both the requesting state and the state of refuge. Charles Kallenbach,
Note, Plomo 0 Plata: Irregular Rendition as a Means of Gaining Jurisdiction over
Colombian Drug Kingpins, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 174 (1990). See gener-
ally BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 311-60 (discussing extraditable offenses). The
state of refuge may extradite the fugitive even if its authorities are competent to
prosecute and where the offense was committed in whole or in part within its own
boundaries. Id. Extradition will be denied if any of these conditions is not met. Ex-
tradition can also be denied if certain exceptions or exemptions apply. Id. at 368; see
Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law: Extradition, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 157-59 (1982) (discussing U.S. ex-
tradition procedure).
24 Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 169; see also 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, IN-
TERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED STATES LAW & PRACTICE 10 (2d ed. 1987)
(stating that delivery of individuals to a requesting sovereign was usually based on
pacts or treaties, and also on the basis of reciprocity and comity); Richard Downing,
The Domestic and International Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals
from Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 573, 577 (1990) ("[Albsent a formal treaty,




disputes stemming from extraterritorial abduction."25  They
have, however, proven to be virtually ineffective.26
Extradition treaties bind only signatory states." Thus, there
is no general duty on the part of non-signatory states to assist in
bringing fugitives to justice.' Consequently, this method of
' Kristin Berdan Weissman, Comment, Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endan-
germent of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 459, 467 (1994); infra notes 33-45
and accompanying text (discussing extraterritorial abductions as means to obtain
jurisdiction over fugitives); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992) (finding that extradition treaty did not prohibit extraterritorial abduction).
Currently, the United States is party to over 102 extradition treaties. Weissman,
supra, at 467. The absence of treaties with 56 countries, including Iran, Libya, and
Syria, has precluded prosecution of terrorists acting against the United States and
its nationals abroad. Id.
2 See infra notes 27-52 and accompanying text (discussing problems and fail-
ures of extradition treaties); see also BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL
FUGITIVES -- A NEW ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE 2 (1991)
("International extradition practices, as they currently exist, are not functioning
adequately."); Downing, supra note 24, at 575 ("Removal of fugitives from foreign
nations by means other than formal extradition has received increased attention,
perhaps because of perceived failures of the multilateral system of extradition trea-
ties.").
2 YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 13-14 ("One of the major problems with extradi-
tion treaties, whether they are multilateral or bilateral, is that they bind only the
signatory states, or those states that have entered into formal agreement."); see Fac-
tor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933) (holding that there is no obligation to ex-
tradite in absence of treaty); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959)
(stating that right of foreign states to demand extradition only exists when created
by treaty); I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1971) ("The exis-
tence of a treaty commitment to the requesting [sitate is an express condition
precedent to extradition .... "); Catherine Logan Piper, Note, Reservations to Multi-
lateral Treaties: The Goal of Universality, 71 IOWA L. REV. 295, 296 (1985) ("Only
those states that have joined the treaty are formally bound by the law that it cre-
ates."); cf. BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing historical practice by states of
surrendering fugitive upon mere request of other state as feature of friendly rela-
tions between sovereigns); SHEARER, supra, at 22 ("[Elxtradition may take place in
the absence of a treaty but as an act of grace rather than of obligation .... ");
YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 12 ("[Slome states do voluntarily extradite individuals
2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 10. Classical commentators on international law
have differed as to the existence of a legal or moral duty requiring the state of ref-
uge to surrender accused persons to the rendering state. Id. For example, Hugo
Grotius asserted that the state of refuge was obligated to either extradite or prose-
cute the individual sought after. Id. Hence, he coined the maxim aut dedere autju-
dicare. Id.; see Rebecca J. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, Sex Discrimination, and
Principles of Equality Under International Law, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 93,
131-32 (1987) ("One can argue that international conventions on human rights even
impose obligations on non-signatories because of their capacity to establish mini-
mum standards of civilized conduct, which must be observed by all international
entities as a condition of their status as states."). But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 24,
at 10 (discussing contrasting views of Puffendorf arguing "duty to extradite was only
1996]
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rendition lacks uniformity in practice,29 thus diminishing the le-
gitimacy of formal extradition as a means of bringing offenders
to justice. ° To be sure, fugitives often choose the state of their
asylum based upon the existence of an extradition treaty: a
problem known as "forum living."
3 1
Even where a treaty exists between states, however, the
state from which extradition is sought may choose not to honor
it.32 For example, strained diplomatic relations between coun-
tries sometimes leads to the denial of extradition notwithstand-
ing the existence of an extradition treaty.3 In such a case, the
an imperfect obligation which required an explicit agreement ... to become fully
binding under international law").
29 YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 14; see BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 31 ("Bilateral
treaty practice in extradition is the most cumbersome form that can be relied upon
because of the lack of uniformity among treaties, and the greater flexibility in treaty
provisions.").
30 BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 54 ("This situation makes it more difficult to as-
certain the precedential value of decisions interpreting a given treaty with respect
to other treaties."); YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 14. The problem with treaties em-
bodying whatever provisions can be negotiated is that the resulting lack of consis-
tency in the practice of extradition leads to potential jurisprudential confusion.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 55.
"' YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 15; see Gianaris, supra note 11, at 92 (stating that
non-signatory nations often served as safe havens for fleeing criminals); see also Mi-
chael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases
After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 136 (1992) ("[Flaced with [the safe haven]
problem, some ... suggest inserting a clause into all extradition treaties to allow the
requested state, if it refuses to extradite, to try the fugitive on its own soil.").
32 SHEARER, supra note 27, at 27 ("[E]xtradition is not looked upon as an abso-
lute international duty ...."); YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 19; see Gianaris, supra
note 11, at 92 ("Signatory nations [do] not always fully abide by these treaties....").
But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 21-22 (discussing case in Venezuela where
court surrendered American national to Panama in absence of extradition treaty
because surrender was "in conformity with the public law of nations"); see also
SHEARER, supra note 27, at 27-34 (discussing extradition in absence of treaty).
There are four grounds upon which a denial of extradition may rest:
1. Grounds relating to the offense itself (i.e., political, military, fiscal);
2. Grounds relating to the relator (i.e., nationals, persons performing official
acts, and persons protected by special immunity);
3. Grounds relating to the prosecution of the offense charged (i.e., legality of the
offense charged, trial in absentia, statute of limitation, and immunity);
4. Grounds relating to the penalty and punishability of the relator (amnesty and
pardon, double jeopardy, death penalty, cruel and unusual punishment).
BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 368-69.
33 Downing, supra note 24, at 576 ("[Ain extradition treaty may become tempo-
rarily suspended due to a break in diplomatic relations....). One of the main rea-
sons for states' reluctance to surrender individuals located within their borders to a
requesting country is national pride and sovereignty. Gianaris, supra note 11, at
105; Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 175. Many other factors, such as resentment har-
bored by the state of refuge toward the requesting state, or intimidation by the
[Vol. 70:755
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requesting state cannot compel the state of refuge to adhere to
the extradition treaty.34 Extradition law is a doctrine of conven-
ience between respective states, not a right which an individual
or a state can claim.35 For example, when the crime involves a
political offense," states are often reluctant to comply with ex-
criminals' terrorist tactics, may also spur this lack of commitment to extradition
treaties. Id. Furthermore, the development of new crimes may render treaties obso-
lete. Id.; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 99 (discussing effect of war on efficacy
of extradition treaties). Consequently, it appears that extradition is an ineffective
means of dealing with complex international crimes.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 50.
Id.
3 See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 383-451 (discussing political of-
fense exception). A political offense is generally defined as conduct directed against
a sovereign which constitutes a threat to a political, religious or racial ideology or its
supporting structures without having the elements of a common crime. BASsIOUNI,
supra note 20, at 379. The elements of a common crime are lacking because the per-
petrator of the offense acts as an agent of a political or religious movement and "is
motivated by ideology or belief but does not cause a private harm." Id. at 382. The
conduct is deemed criminal because the interest to be protected is that of the sover-
eign rather than a private individual. Id. at 379. The state criminalizes such conduct
in order to protect itself. Id. at 380. Examples of purely political offenses, or offenses
directed at the state, are treason, sedition, and espionage. Id. Although extradition
was traditionally granted for these offenses, modern treaties usually exclude them
from extradition. Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 175; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note
24, at 384 n.11 (demonstrating typical language of political offense exception);
SHEARER, supra note 27, at 166-193 (defining and discussing political offenses);
Daniel H. Derby, A Democratic Response to Foreign Political Offenses: The Need for
Legislation to Counter Anti-Terrorism Excesses, 1 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5
(1988) (distinguishing "mixed" and "pure" political offenses). Thus, while
"[g]overnments are the subjects of [the regulation of extradition] .... individuals are
the objects of its outcome." BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 49. Restrictions and de-
fenses which exist under extradition law are primarily designed for the benefit of
the states involved. Id. at 50. For example, with the political offense exception, it is
within the discretion of the state of refuge to recognize or reject the accused's con-
tention that his conduct falls within the scope of the political offense exception. Id;
see also Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 175 ("[T]he political offense exception gener-
ally is open to interpretation by the asylum state .... [tlhis means that the asylum
state is free to interpret this provision of the treaty as broadly or as narrowly as it
chooses and can change interpretations to match different circumstances."). One
must realize that this will be done in light of the state's own needs. Id.; see also
BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 6 ("[Tihere is a nexus between the interests of the re-
spective states and the granting or denial of extradition.").
Currently, with the spread of violent crimes, many states have begun to rene-
gotiate extradition treaties exempting violent crimes from the political offense ex-
ception. Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an International
Criminal Court, 1 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 135, 155 (1995). For example, eight Euro-
pean countries have accepted the European Convention on the Suppression of Ter-
rorism, which narrows the scope of the political offense exception eliminating cer-
tain violent crimes from exemption. Id. at 155-56. Thus, these states no longer
exempt those involved in aircraft hijacking, sabotage, attacks against diplomats,
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tradition treaties because of the potential political backlash con-
nected with taking such action. Thus, states often ignore the
treaty and except the individual from extradition as a political
refugee entitled to asylum. 8
A further constraint on the legitimacy of extradition treaties
is that, in spite of their existence, incidents of illegal interna-
tional extradition continue to occur.39 Extradition is not seen as
an "absolute" international duty." Thus, the difficulties encoun-
tered in securing fugitives and the length and costs of formal ex-
tradition proceedings, often lead even those states with extradi-
tion treaties to resort to these extralegal means of rendition.4
hostage taking, kidnapping, use of explosives and automatic firearms, from extradi-
tion. Id. at 156.
31 See, e.g., David M. Kennedy et al. The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31
HARV. INT'L L.J. 5, 12-20 (1990) (discussing same); Scharf, supra note 36, at 152
(discussing Colombian drug barons' use of wealth to organize private armies, pur-
chase weapons and "bribe, intimidate, and terrorize the Colombian justice and po-
litical systems") (citation omitted); id. at 150-51 (examining Greece's denial of ex-
tradition request of Mohammed Rashid, Palestinian terrorist, in response to PLO
threats of political repercussions); Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 171 (explaining
difficulty of extradition in Colombia due to inherent disadvantages as well as politi-
cal influence of drug kingpins fearful of being tried in America); Mark A. Synnes,
Comment, The Attempted Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei: Discretion and the
U.S.-West German Extradition Treaty, 8 WIS. INT'L L.J. 123 (1989) (discussing West
Germany's refusal to extradite terrorists to United States for prosecution because of
political pressure); Emily MacFarquhar & Jennifer Griffin, Under Attack in Paki-
stan Americans Died, but Benazir Bhutto is a Political Target, Too, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Mar. 20, 1995, at 52, 56 ("Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's gov-
ernment ... is increasingly seen by Pakistanis as too compliant with American inter-
ests ....").
See YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 19-20 (discussing various factors which influ-
ence government's decision to except person from extradition). But see United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1350 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting U.S. gov-
ernment's contention that it is free to invoke or ignore extradition treaties at will).
" YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 1. This method of rendition is based on the con-
cept of reprisal. Weissman, supra note 25, at 465. A reprisal occurs when an entity
takes something, or in the case of an abduction, someone, from another entity in
satisfaction for a harm caused by them. Id. These abductions occur both in situa-
tions where a treaty does exist and where there is no treaty in effect. Id. at 467.
" See, e.g., Rita Patel, Comment, One More Effect of NAFTA-A Multilateral
Extradition Treaty?, 14 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 153, 157 (1995) (noting Supreme Court's
statement that "principles of international law recognize no right to extradition
apart from [tireaty"); Weissman, supra note 25, at 468 (discussing United States'
approach towards extraterritorial abduction).
41 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 123; SHEARER, supra note 27, at 67 ("States
sometimes resort to alternative methods of rendition ... although extradition proce-
dures are available and applicable to the fugitive in question [because] other meth-
ods of disposing of the problem appear swifter and less demanding in terms of trou-
ble and expense."); see, e.g., Kai I. Rebane, Note, Extradition and Individual Rights:
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Examples of such extraterritorial abductions42 include the ab-
duction of Adolph Eichmann by Israel in 1960, 4" the United
States' invasion of Panama and subsequent "extradition" of Gen-
eral Manuel Noriega in 1989," and the forceful kidnapping of
Dr. Alvarez-Machain from Mexico in 1992. 45
The Need for an International Criminal Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19
FORDHAMi INT'L. L.J. 1636, 1680-81 (1996) (discussing impact of extralegal rendi-
tion); Weissman, supra note 25, at 460 (discussing extraterritorial abduction of air-
craft hijacker, Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq, from Nigeria in 1985); infra notes 43-45
and accompanying text. See generally Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 194-216
(discussing extraterritorial abduction and alternatives).
' See BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 124 (stating that abduction and kidnapping
are devices "characterized by the fact that agents of one state acting under color of
law unlawfully seize the body of a person within the jurisdiction of another state
without its consent and in violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity").
43 One of the most famous cases of irregular rendition involved the 1961 Israeli
kidnapping of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from Argentina. See Attorney
General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 1. L R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962); YARNOLD, supra note
26, at 47-49; Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 207; Weissman, supra note 25, at 475
(observing that no extradition treaty existed between Israel and Argentina); Andrew
David Wolfberg, Comment, Israel v. Ivan (John) Demjanjuk; Wachmann Demjanjuk
Allowed to Go Free, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 445, 453-55 (1995) (discussing
Eichmann trial).
4 United States military forces disregarded the existing extradition treaty,
ousted former dictator Manuel Noriega and escorted him back to the U.S. for trial
on drug charges. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 172; see also Weissman, supra note 25, at 483
(stating that "although it is unlikely that Noriega would have extradited himself if
the United States had formally requested it, the U.S. invasion of Panama made such
a request impracticable"). See generally YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 59-66
(examining U.S. political motives for extraditing Noriega); Charles E. Hickey, Note,
The Dictator, Drugs and Diplomacy by Indictment: Head-of-State Immunity in
United States v. Noriega, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 729, 730-31 (1989) (asserting that Su-
preme Court's upholding of indictment was correct but that Executive Branch's de-
cision to indict was diplomatically inappropriate).
4' Dr. Humbarto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen, was captured in Mexico
and brought back to the United States on charges of abducting, torturing, and mur-
dering a Drug Enforcement Administration agent. See United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992); Edmund S. McAlister, Note, The Hydraulic
Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-Machain and the Case for a Justifi-
able Abduction, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 449, 449 (1994). It was argued that his abduc-
tion was in violation of a long-standing extradition treaty between the United States
and Mexico. See Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. at 662-65, 668 (holding that treaty did
not prohibit, explicitly or impliedly, forcible abduction). But see Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that abduction was in violation of
treaty); Jonathan A. Bush, Essay, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After
Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 947 (1993); Elizabeth Chien, Note, United
States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain: Government-Sponsored International Kid-
napping as an Alternative to Extradition?, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 179, 201-03 (1993)
(asserting Supreme Court has set dangerous precedent by taking "restrictive view"
of treaty and refusing to imply prohibition of forcible abduction).
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Extraterritorial abduction offends the sovereignty of the
target state by intruding upon its territorial integrity and poses
a grave threat to international peace and security." These vio-
lations are not made more acceptable simply because they are
done for the purpose of capturing alleged criminals and bringing
them to justice.47 Furthermore, customary international law,
which is comprised of principles that have evolved over time to
obtain the status of law in the international forum, prohibits ex-
traterritorial abduction.48 Because international custom reflects
the foundation of international relations, all nations are bound
by those norms that proscribe extraterritorial abduction. 9 Ex-
traterritorial renditions violate international law and endanger
46 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §432 cmt. c (1987) (stating that nation's agents may not seize individual
from another nation without consent of other nation's government). "A state enjoys
full sovereignty and self-determination over its territory and over persons and prop-
erty in that territory unless international law contains specific rules to the con-
trary." INGRID DETTER DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE
21 (2d ed. 1987); see YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 69 (noting that sovereignty exists
and may be violated by extralegal remedies to extradition). Acts of kidnapping and
abduction as methods of rendition involve three major violations: (1) they disrupt
the world public order; (2) they infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of states; and (3) they violate the human rights of the individual unlawfully seized.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 124; see also Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 211
(discussing contention that irregular rendition disregards human rights guarantees
in U.N. Charter, OAS Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other trea-
ties, court decisions, and UN resolutions).
47 YARNOLD, supra note 26, at 70. But see Weissman, supra note 25, at 484
(acknowledging that many commentators believe that extraterritorial abduction, in
certain situations, is acceptable method of bringing criminals to justice).
's See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state .... "). "Because extraterritorial abduction is a
type of armed reprisal," some experts believe it is prohibited by the U.N. Charter.
Weissman, supra note 25, at 471. But see U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (allowing member
states to use individual or collective self-defense if attacked by another nation);
Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 194-95 ("Although criticized by some international law
experts, [irregular rendition] may be allowable under international law ....").
'9 Weissman, supra note 25, at 487-88; see Charles Biblowit, Transborder Ab-
ductions and United Nations Policy: Comments on United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 105, 114 (1996) (discussing Department of Justice
opinion that condemned F.B.I. extraterritorial abductions as violative of customary
international law); Dea Abramschmitt, Note, Neighboring Countries; U.N.-
Neighborly Acts: A Look at the Extradition Relationships Among the United States,
Mexico and Canada, 4 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 121, 139-40 (1995) (stating that
international custom requires abductee to be returned to asylum country that ob-
jected to extraterritorial abduction). But see Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 195
(stating that neither international treaties nor international human rights instru-
ments explicitly prohibit [extraterritorial abduction]).
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the international community. It is therefore in the best interest
of the international community to oppose such seizures and to
work to eliminate their occurrence.50
The sophistication of modern crime and the increasing in-
terdependency of the international world order have rendered le-
gal enforcement mechanisms of the past ineffectual.' Accord-
ingly, the global community needs a more advanced mechanism
for addressing the changing needs of the international sphere.
II. THE WRONG ANSWER: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
In recent years, there has been much discussion regarding
the creation of an international criminal court to remedy the ju-
risdictional problems which arise when criminals cross territo-
rial borders and the ineffectiveness of extradition treaties in ob-
taining jurisdiction over them.2 Such a court would replace the
ad hoc tribunals that have been set up in the past to try indi-
See Weissman, supra note 25, at 492.See Downing, supra note 24, at 576 (stating that domestic government's en-
forcement capabilities are inadequate); Kallenbach, supra note 23, at 214
("Extradition, which is the established method of gaining jurisdiction over criminals,
has proved, and will continue to prove, to be a failure in Colombia."); Andrea Sachs,
A Fate Better than Death: What's the Best Way to Escape Capital Punishment?
Maybe Fleeing the Country and Fighting Extradition Proceeding Abroad, TIME, Mar.
4, 1991, at 52.
52 "e proposals to establish permanent international courts took more tangi-
ble form following World War I." HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 172; see, e.g., M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1991) (discussing various United Nations proposals
with respect to establishment of international criminal court); Gianaris, supra note
11, at 109 ([Tihe United States should pursue the establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court to assist the international community in dealing more effec-
tively with those acts of terrorism, drug trafficking, genocide and torture that are
condemned as criminal acts in the international conventions .... '") (quoting H.R.J.
Res. 66, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (1989)). One of the first proposals for the creation
of an International Criminal Court was made in 1926 by the International Law As-
sociation. HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 170. After the failure of that proposal,
another attempt was made in 1951. See DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (Annex to the Report of the Committee on International Criminal
Jurisdiction), 7th Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 11, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).
This, too, failed and a revised version was resubmitted. REVISED DRAFT STATUTE
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 7th Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 12, at 23,
U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954). Since then several private groups have been active in at-
tempting to promote the establishment of an international criminal court through
alternative means. HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 170. See generally Scharf, su-
pra note 36, at 135 (discussing historical development of proposal for international
criminal court).
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viduals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.53
Proponents of the court assert that it would provide an effective
forum to handle international problems which are currently left
unaddressed." These proponents also contend that this entity
would afford an alternative forum to states reluctant to extradite
a criminal to another state to be tried,55 while also providing a
common platform for the prosecution of crimes which threaten
the security of the international community.56 Such crimes in-
5 See, e.g., HIPPCHEN & YIM, supra note 8, at 168-69 (discussing Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal and International Military Tribunal for the Far
East established after World War II); Bassiouni, supra note 52, at 4-5 (discussing
same). These tribunals were precedents for a permanent international court. Id. at
1; see also Michael D. Greenberg, Note, Creating an International Criminal Court,
10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 119, 122-25 (1992) (discussing precedents for international crimi-
nal tribunal). But see Scharf, supra note 36, at 138 ("[T]he experience gained
through the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals is largely inapplicable to the creation
of a standing international criminal court in our time.").
5 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 151 (1992). The current system relies on a series of interna-
tional conventions which define certain offenses and require states to criminalize
conduct and prosecute or extradite the offenders. Scharf, supra note 36, at 147-48.
"Such conventions cover crimes against peace, aggression, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, torture, apartheid, drug offenses, counterfeiting, slav-
ery, traffic in women and children, piracy, maritime terrorism, aircraft hijacking,
aircraft sabotage, crimes against officials and diplomats, and hostage taking." Id.
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Room for improvement, however, exists
within the system. Id. at 149. "[Tlerrorism, international narcotics trafficking and
human rights crimes continue to burden the modern world." Greenberg, supra note
53, at 128-29. These types of criminal activities have not been adequately prevented
by existing bilateral agreements, international conventions, or ad hoc criminal tri-
bunals. Id. at 129. Thus, there is an opportunity and a need to advance interna-
tional law by "establishing an international criminal court to preserve peace, ad-
vance the protection of human rights and reduce international and transnational
criminality." Bassiouni, supra note 52, at 1.
55 Gianaris, supra note 11, at 109; see also Greenberg, supra note 53, at 131 ("An
international criminal court ... would present an attractive extradition option for
nations ... which have sometimes refused, when threatened with terrorist retalia-
tion, to extradite terrorists to requesting governments."); Scharf, supra note 36, at
150 (stating that "the availability of [an international court] ... may, in itself, be of
value where states wish to accommodate their international duties, but are reluc-
tant to extradite a fugitive for fear of diplomatic, political, or security-related conse-
quences."). Thus, for countries whose governments lack the ability to extradite or
prosecute terrorists or drug traffickers, the availability of an international criminal
court could facilitate prosecution and ease political tensions connected with extra-
dition. Id. at 153.
" See Rebane, supra note 41, at 1674 ("An [International Criminal Court] would
provide a neutral forum with uniform laws applicable to all who came before the
Court."); Greenberg, supra note 53, at 126; Scharf, supra note 36, at 157 ("[Tlhe ba-
sic advantage of establishing an international criminal court would be the promotion
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clude terrorism, international drug trafficking, money launder-
ing, weapons trafficking, human rights violations, .war crimes,
and environmental crimes."
Advocates of the international criminal court also point out
that it could be a vehicle for eliminating the political offense ex-
ception to extradition." They contend that the justifications for
the political offense exception in extradition treaties would not
even apply to trials conducted by the international court because
it would provide for a fair and neutral forum in which to try ac-
cused criminals. 9 In general, advocates of this view assert that
the creation of an international criminal court is imperative in
the context of the changing nature of international society, the
sophistication of modern crime, and the increasing interdepen-
dency of the international world order.'
Opponents of an international criminal court, identify five
major obstacles to the creation of an effective international
criminal tribunal.' First, there is no international criminal
code.62 This lack of consensus as to the governing international
law has interfered with the creation of an international criminal
court. 3 Although drafts of an international criminal code have
been introduced many times, the United Nations has repeatedly
failed to adopt any version. Thus, the principle nullum crimen
of 'uniform and consistent interpretation of the law.'").
Greenberg, supra note 53, at 126.
5 Scharf, supra note 36, at 154. For a discussion on the political offense excep-
tion, see supra note 36 and accompanying text. The political offense exception was
created in response to two main concerns. First, the humanitarian concern for a fu-
gitive who may not receive a fair trial in cases of political offenses, and second, the
desire to avoid choosing sides in the domestic conflicts of another state. Id. at 155.
See Gianaris, supra note 11, at 110.
Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 154.
6 See generally Daniel B. Pickard, Comment, Security Council Resolution 808: A
Step Toward a Permanent International Court for the Prosecution of International
Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 435, 460 (1995)
(stating that "[albsence of an international criminal code and the continuing insis-
tence by states on the retention of an archaic concept of national sovereignty in an
absolute and uncompromising manner" has prevented creation of international
criminal court).
6 See Pickard, supra note 61, at 441.
3 Id.
4 In 1949, the United Nations began to codify international criminal offenses
through the International Law Commission and the Committee on International
Trade. Baez, supra note 1, at 293; Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal
Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 375-76 (1992). In 1954, however, efforts were stalled by the fail-
ure to define the principal international crime, aggression. Id. at 377. Without this
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sine lege, nulla poena sine lege65 becomes particularly poignant.
No nation can legitimately recognize an international court
which has no laws to enforce."
Second, the reluctance of states to submit themselves or
their nationals to the jurisdiction of an international authority
has posed an obstacle to the creation of an international criminal
court. 7 Like all international institutions, such a court would
definition, there would be no international criminal code. Id. Soon thereafter, the
need for a legal mechanism to control the violent behavior of states became appar-
ent. Id. Accordingly, work on a code of crimes resumed. That same year, the Inter-
national Law Commission submitted the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind to the United Nations. See U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/2693 (1954); see also Ferencz, supra, at 380 (discussing provisions of ILC
Draft Statute). The draft, however, was far from complete and many changes
needed to be made. See Melissa Gordon, Note & Comment, Justice on Trial: The Ef-
ficacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 217, 237-39 (1995) (discussing imperfections in ILC draft statute and its direct
effect on development of international criminal court). The Code has been reintro-
duced over the past thirty-nine years, but has never been adopted. Pickard, supra
note 61 at 443.
6" Pickard, supra note 61, at 441-42. This phrase literally means "no crime with-
out law, no punishment without law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (6th ed. 1990);
see also Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an In-
ternational Criminal Court, 33 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 81 (1995) (defining
phrase as "no crime and no punishment without law").
" See Pickard, supra note 61, at 442. The idea of an international criminal court
is often challenged on the ground that there is no clear compilation of prohibited
conduct pursuant to international law which can be deemed to give notice to poten-
tial offenders. Marquardt, supra note 65, at 104 (discussing contention that
"purported international crimes to be prosecuted in an international court are too
vague and malleable to give fair notice of prohibited conduct."). Thus, many oppo-
nents of the establishment of an international criminal court state that interna-
tional criminal law is so ill-defined, that it is "void for vagueness" under the U.S.
Constitution. Id.; see Ferencz, supra note 64, at 382-91 (discussing causal link be-
tween failed efforts in creating international criminal court and lack of criminal
code). But see Greenberg, supra note 53, at 133 (stating that creation of interna-
tional criminal court would assist in development and codification of international
criminal law); Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 176 ("The prospect of arriv-
ing at a sufficient, coherent, and systematic code of offenses that will meet criminal
justice standards of legality does not appear insurmountable, in view of the already-
proposed Draft International Criminal Code and the proposed Statute of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, if the political will to do so is achieved.").
6' See Pickard, supra note 61, at 440-41. Traditionally, states have been reluc-
tant to submit to any authority having compulsory jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stein-
berger, supra note 10, at 195-201 (discussing reservations of states with respect to
compulsory jurisdiction of International Court of Justice); Pickard, supra note 61, at
443-47 (discussing unwillingness of nations at Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and
1907 to submit to jurisdiction of international court); Raymond Ranjeva, Global Jus-
tice -- Compulsory Jurisdiction and the Role of the ICJ, 17 HARV. INT'L REV. 16, 16
(1995) ("Sovereignty and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are one of interna-
tional law's odd couples."); see also 140 CONG. REC. S121, S123 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
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depend largely upon voluntary participation." A voluntary ar-
rangement among states, however, would not be sufficient in
cases where non-party governments refused to submit to the ju-
risdiction of the court, or when a government is defeated after a
military conflict leaving no government in its place to comply
with a court order." Thus, provisions for compulsory jurisdic-
tion, either exclusive,7" concurrent," or a combination of the two,72
1986) (statement of Sen. Helms) ("[The United States] better take our time and we
better know what we are doing before we even appear to be in favor of having ... an
international court ... [we] do not want to water down the sovereignty of the United
States of America one drop.").
0 Greenberg, supra note 53, at 138.
' Id.
70 Of all three approaches, the one for exclusive jurisdiction is the most difficult
to achieve politically. Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 169. This approach
requires states to relinquish their jurisdiction with respect to crimes coming under
the jurisdiction of the international criminal court. See Scharf, supra note 36, at
160. The court's jurisdiction can extend to all offenses or select ones. Id.; see Bas-
siouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 169 (explaining that states would most likely
grant court exclusive jurisdiction with respect to those crimes unlikely to occur on
their territory such as genocide, apartheid, or slavery thereby creating appearance
that they are responsible participants in international processes). Under this ap-
proach, therefore, national courts would be precluded from exercising jurisdiction
with regard to offenses over which the international criminal court has jurisdiction.
Scharf, supra note 36, at 160. The advantage of this approach is that it facilitates
"the development of a coherent and consistent body of law." Id. (citing statement by
Patrick Robinson, Representative of Jamaica to the UN Sixth Committee on No-
vember 7, 1990 at 13-14) The disadvantage, however, is that this approach requires
the most significant relinquishment of national sovereignty. Id.; see Bassiouni &
Blakesley, supra note 54, at 169 (explaining that "[sltates are reluctant to relinquish
jurisdiction to an international criminal court for a variety of xenophobic reasons, as
well as legitimate political and practical concerns").
" "Concurrent jurisdiction implies that a state having jurisdiction under any of
the four internationally recognized areas of jurisdiction, namely territorial, national-
ity, passive personality, and protected interests, would be able to exercise that ju-
risdiction." Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 170. The Court would also have
jurisdiction over the matter. Id. "Under [this] approach, a state chooses whether to
institute an action before a domestic court, or to extradite the offender to another
state for prosecution, or to institute an action before the international [criminal]
court." Scharf, supra note 36, at 160. Therefore, preserving sovereign powers, coun-
tries would not be compelled to turn over offenders to the international court. Id.;
see also Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the
1990s, 10 DICK. J. INTL L. 223, 244 (1992) (emphasizing that concurrent jurisdiction
would assure member states that their sovereignty would remain intact).
The major disadvantage of this concurrent approach is that it could lead to con-
fficts of jurisdiction between states having a joint interest in a case. See Scharf, su-
pra note 36, at 161; see also Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 170-71
(discussing disadvantages of concurrent jurisdiction).
72 Under a proposed jurisdictional option, the Jurisdiction on the Basis of Trans-
fer of Criminal Proceedings approach, "the state with original jurisdiction 'would not
lose jurisdiction, but [would] merely transfer the criminal proceedings to the
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would be required for a court to succeed.73  States are unwilling
to surrender any control within their own territories. Unfortu-
nately, states strongly object to subjecting their citizens to the
jurisdiction of an international court because they fear it will
erode their sovereignty and impair their freedom of government
action. 4
Third, there is a concern that an international criminal
court will disrupt the existing system of international law.7' For
example, opponents of an international criminal court assert
that if the court were to have exclusive jurisdiction over particu-
lar offenses, a state's obligation to surrender a fugitive to the ju-
risdiction of the international criminal court would conflict with
Court.'" See Scharf, supra note 36, at 162 (citation omitted). This method would al-
low the court to utilize "the substantive law of the transferring state. Id. There
are, however, many problems inherent in this approach. For example, the transfer
of proceedings method "does not eliminate the need for an extradition relationship
with an international criminal court and therefore does not avoid the jurisdictional
and sovereignty problems" associated with the issue. See id. at 162-64 (discussing
problems associated with this transfer of proceedings approach). See generally Bas-
siouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 171-74 (discussing transfer of proceedings
mechanism).
73 See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 138-39 (discussing need for limited compul-
sory jurisdiction provision). But see Gordon, supra note 64, at 241 (stating that "the
[clourt would ... have consensual, rather than compulsory, jurisdiction").
"4 See Marquardt, supra note 65, at 142 ("Many in the United States criticize an
international criminal court on the ground that subjecting United States citizens ...
to the potential jurisdiction of an international criminal court will erode the sover-
eignty of the United States and impair the freedom of action of its government.");
see also Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 161 ("A number of states are fear-
ful of losing control of the adjudicatory or prosecutorial process because they believe
that sovereignty requires it, that their own constitutions require it, or that this loss
of control may produce adverse results."); Cavicchia, supra note 71, at 229 ("Some
nations expressed concern. that ... establishment [of international criminal court]
would be inconsistent with national sovereignty...."). But see Ferencz, supra note 64,
at 391-92 stating that:
[T]he notion of absolute state sovereignty is obsolete ... Every time a na-
tion enters into a treaty ... it cedes some of its rights. But it also gains
something in return. The correct notion of sovereignty, the power of the
sovereign to better serve his people, is not diminished by treaties but
rather is enhanced [by them].
Id.
75 See Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals
and American Concerns, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 121, 124 (1994) ("The argument has ...
been raised that an international criminal jurisdiction might disrupt or detract from
the existing extradition regime, thus causing damage to the present system of in-
ternational criminal law enforcement."). "11is is a real danger, and one that we be-
lieve should be considered very carefully.'" Scharf, supra note 36, at 164 (quoting
John Knox, Representative of the United States to the U.N. Sixth Committee, on
November 7, 1990, at 4).
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its obligations to extradite the fugitive to another state or to un-
dertake its own prosecution. 6 If, on the other hand, the court
were to be given concurrent jurisdiction, it is not clear what in-
centive states would have to turn offenders over to an interna-
tional court rather than prosecute the offenders themselves or
extradite them to the state where the crime occurred.7 7  Fur-
thermore, opponents of an international criminal court are con-
cerned that the creation of such an institution would "divert re-
sources and attention away from more practical and readily
achievable means for combating international criminal activi-
ties."6 These opponents contend that some of the long term goals
of the international community have always been to secure ac-
ceptance by more countries of existing international conventions
that contain the "prosecute or extradite" concept to ensure ad-
herence by signatories to these conventions, and to establish
conventions which would address newly emergent issues.79 In
addition, these opponents suggest that the pursuit of an inter-
national court would overshadow the progress already made in
achieving these goals."
International criminal court opponents further contend that
76 Scharf, supra note 36, at 160; see also Evered, supra note 75, at 122-23
(noting risks associated with court exercising compulsory jurisdiction).
7 See Scharf, supra note 36 at 160-61 (discussing conflicts that would result
when more than one state simultaneously has jurisdiction over offense and propos-
ing possible solutions); see also Gordon, supra note 64, at 241 (recognizing that
"concurrent jurisdiction may cause bitter conflicts," but stressing that "the expected
positive results of the International Criminal Court, such as improved extradition
and prosecution, will greatly outweigh those instances of inconvenience when those
conflicts occur").
'a See Scharf, supra note 36, at 164 (quoting John Knox, United States Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, Sixth Committee, on November 7, 1990, at 4); see
also Evered, supra note 75, at 131 (highlighting "concern for wasted resources" as
one of foremost objections to establishment of international criminal court). "It has
been cautioned that a new international court might ... divert resources from other
important efforts to control international crime." Id. at 136-37.
'9 Scharf, supra note 36, at 164-65 (citing letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assis-
tant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Congressman
Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Committe on Foreign Affairs (Dec. 12, 1990)
(on file with LLEI)).
'0 See Gordon, supra note 64, at 241 (citing arguments of critics of international
criminal court as to danger that resources will be diverted from more mundane con-
cerns such as efforts to combat crime). See generally Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 45-46, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990) (discussing advantages and disad-
vantages associated with disrupting implementation of existing system by creation
of court).
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the trial of terrorists in an international criminal court would
"glamorize" the offender's position by all the publicity sure to ac-
company such a trial." Finally, opponents are concerned that
the tribunal would evolve into a politicized body which would, in
turn, make unjustified or groundless accusations against public
officials for political purposes.82 These opponents suggest the
possibility that the court would be a "mechanism for propa-
ganda" inflicting harm and feelings of contempt upon the tar-
geted administration.83 Thus, it appears that an international
tribunal embracing "victor's justice" would do more harm than
good in light of the current international climate. Justice Jack-
son's statement that, "[t]o pass ... defendants a poisoned chalice
is to put it to our own lips as well ... ,.' is a fitting analogy given
the inherent risks of a corrupt and discriminatory court.
Nevertheless, cases exist in which corruption or political
posturing have caused the failure of both domestic prosecution
and bilateral cooperation." Although an international criminal
8' Gordon, supra note 64, at 165; see also Cavicchia, supra note 71, at 233
("Some fears have been voiced that an ICC would hinder other law enforcement en-
deavors by glamorizing the accused's position by providing him with an interna-
tional forum."). But see Greenberg, supra note 53, at 132 (stating that international
criminal tribunal would in fact deter future crime). The mere existence of an inter-
national criminal court would warn potential offenders of the international com-
munity's intolerance for crime. Id.
"2 Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 162; see also Evered, supra note 75,
at 131 (stressing "need to ensure that the court will not become politicized"). "A
number of officials have expressed apprehension that proceedings might be initiated
for political reasons, and have voiced concern that judges from alien legal systems or
adversarial countries will sit in judgement [sic] of their nationals." Id. at 145 (citing
Eleventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind, International Law Commission, 44th sess., para. 8 at 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/442
(1993)). But see Marquardt, supra note 65, at 144 stating that:
[Ilt is not clear that high-profile defendants in international cases receive
depoliticized treatment under the current system .... [and] institutional
constraints on politicization ... have been built into the latest draft statute
for the international criminal court. There are at least three levels of
screening that any charges of international criminality must pass before
they may be brought before the proposed international court.
See id. at 145-46 (discussing these constraints).
83 Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 54, at 162. But see Bassiouni, supra note
52, at 12-13 (finding that real opposition comes from governmental officials hoping
to shield themselves from international accountability, as well as to avoid embar-
rassment).
8 See Ferencz, supra note 64, at 392 (quoting ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE CASE
AGAINST THE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 7, 90-91 (1946)).
8' See Scharf, supra note 36, at 151-52 (finding that when country chooses
prosecution over extradition, obtaining conviction is more difficult since evidence is
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court with compulsory jurisdiction may not be the correct solu-
tion, an international tribunal of another sort is a viable option.
III. THE ONLY SOLUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
COMMISSION
The solution to the problems associated with the increasing
magnitude and sophistication of international crime appears to
be the establishment of an International Justice Commission.
This Commission would address common crimes which threaten
the fabric of society.86 From Nairobi to New Orleans, from Buda-
pest to Buenos Aires, from Uganda to the United States, crimes
such as murder and rape are committed on a daily basis." The
continuing failure of the international community to address
these atrocities will result in nothing short of disaster. Cur-
rently, no entity exists to govern states and to enforce interna-
tional criminal law.8 As a result, most of these crimes go unpun-
ished. This Commission, however, with equal representation
from all member states, would be responsible for the enforce-
ment of international extradition laws. 9 A universal extradition
treaty signed by all member states would facilitate this task.
Therefore, if a person were to commit an enumerated offense"0
within the borders of a member state, the Commission would en-
not located in prosecuting country frequently).
" See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text (discussing common crimes).
" See supra note 19 (discussing prevalence of these "street crimes"); see, e.g.,
Meron, supra note 16, at 424-25 (discussing abuses in Bosnia-Hercegovina).
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Considerations on Inter-state Cooperation in
Criminal Matters, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 123, 129 (1992) (noting that "substantive in-
ternational criminal law is enforced indirectly by the cooperation of member-
states").
The "indirect enforcement scheme" derives from the notion that states ob-
ligate themselves, through various regional and international instruments,
to carry out the enforcement of international criminal law. The "direct en-
forcement scheme"....presupposes the existence ... of an international
criminal court, and the existence of international enforcement machinery.
Id. at 128 n.13 (citing M. CHERiF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR A INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987)).
" See generally Richard Allan, Terrorism, Extradition & International Sanc-
tions, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 327, 337-40 (1993) (discussing need for neutral or-
ganization to control extradition process).
, The offenses should be based on the minimum demands of civilized behavior.
The list should exclude political crimes because "one man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter or hero." WILLIAM L. WAUGH, JR., INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM 2 (1982); see also Scharf, supra note 36, at 158 (discussing lack of agreement
on specific crimes that should be covered by International Criminal Code).
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sure the extradition of the accused to the state where the inci-
dent occurred. If the country from which extradition was sought
were to fail to comply with the Commission's demands, then all
of the member states would impose penal sanctions, both fiscal
and economic in nature, upon that country.9'
This proposal circumvents those obstacles which stand in
the path of an international criminal court. First, the lack of
consensus as to the governing international law has no bearing
on the success of an International Justice Commission.92 The
Conunission would merely enforce the extradition agreement
among states, it would not impose its law upon them. The state
where the incident occurred would apply its own law in trying
the offender. Second, the reluctance of states to surrender their
sovereignty would be alleviated because the member states
would retain their sovereign rights to try offenses which oc-
curred within their borders in their own domestic courts.93 The
Commission would simply ensure compliance with a universally
9'1 "One important theory of international criminal law is that which deals with
the penalization of certain given conduct." MALEKIAN, supra note 1, at 37. Because
this system would break down, as with bilateral extradition treaties, if there were
no penalties imposed on nations harboring criminals, penal sanctions should be
applied to these states. See, e.g., Gianaris, supra note 11, at 117 (discussing eco-
nomic sanctions currently being applied against Libya by United Nations to compel
surrender of suspects in Lockerbie bombing). "When a nation refuses to cooperate,
the appropriate official could go to the U.N. Security Council and request that eco-
nomic sanctions be applied to encourage cooperation." Id.; see also Paul C. Szasz,
Alternate Strategies for the United Nations' Fight Against Terrorism, 3 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 343, 352 (1993) ("It would be possible to establish a special sanctions
system ....").
International criminal sanctions are those rules, provisions, regulations, and
customs which approve or permit acts to be taken against any individual, organiza-
tion, or state violating the system of international law. MALEKIAN, supra note 1, at
40. These sanctions are "designed to secure enforcement measures by imposing a
penalty for violations." Id.; see Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and Inter-
national Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 300-24 (1987) (considering ra-
tionales for economic sanctions).
Traditional penal sanctions, such as an international prison, international
community service, or international parole may not be the best means of enforcing
extradition treaties. Non-retributive forms such as fines, political and moral obliga-
tions, economic compensation, and military or community service may prove to be a
more functional way of punishing criminals. See Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent
International Criminal Court: A Proposal That Overcomes Past Objections, 23
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 419, 441 (1995).
92 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing lack of consensus
and absence of international criminal code).
93 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (noting reluctance of states to
relinquish any of their sovereignty).
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accepted extradition treaty; it would play no part in the actual
adjudication of the offenders. Moreover, the creation of this in-
stitution would not in any way risk disrupting the existing sys-
tem of international law.94 If anything, the Commission would
enable international law to function more efficiently and help the
"prosecute or extradite" principle to become a reality. Finally,
because the Commission would not enforce bilateral agreements,
it would not be at risk of becoming a politicized institution.95
Rather, it would act as an umbrella organization representing
each member state equally. Consequently, there could be no re-
taliatory actions against one member state without affecting
each and every other member state. Thus, the creation of the In-
ternational Justice Commission appears to be the best policy for
the advancement of international law and for the prevention and
control of international and transnational criminality.
CONCLUSION
Human societies have generally had two kinds of law: divine
and positive. Divine law embodies the rules and teachings re-
ceived through the Word of God, while positive law has always
been enshrined and enforced by the authorities in power. Inter-
national law is positive law and is a relatively new creation.96
In the application of international law to contemporary po-
litical situations, the body empowered to interpret and enforce it
plays a critical role.97 The existing system of extradition is inef-
fective for several reasons. First, extradition treaties fail to
function efficiently because there is no authoritative body to en-
force them. Even where a treaty exists between two states, the
various "escape clauses" render these treaties porous and inef-
fective. The proposed International Justice Commission would
resolve these issues by enforcing a universal extradition treaty
among states. It would ensure that nations adhere to the terms
of the agreement and impose penalties upon those who did not.
An international criminal court would also fail to resolve the
0 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (expressing concern that com-
mission would disrupt existing system of international law).
95 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (addressing fear of politiciza-
tion).
" Tariq Aziz, Law of the Jungle -Power Over Principle in International Law, 17
HARV. INT'L REV. 30, 30 (1995).
97 Id.
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problems present in the international arena. The legitimate
reluctance of individual states to relinquish their sovereignty to
an international tribunal, coupled with the lack of consensus as
to the governing international law, has frustrated efforts to
create such an entity. The proposal for a Commission, however,
eliminates the concerns of states as to the loss of sovereignty by
ensuring compliance with the extradition treaty among all
member states without partaking in the actual adjudicatory
proceedings of offenders. Furthermore, because the member
states themselves would compile a list of universal offenses
which all members agreed would be "extraditable" offenses, an
International Criminal Code would not be required.
The increasing magnitude of international crime demands
that we create a system that addresses the problems that plague
the international sphere and successfully eliminates the threat
to the current world order. The International Justice Commis-
sion appears to be the institution best equipped to accomplish
these goals. Not only would it successfully curb international
crime, but the Commission would also unify states in their battle
to ensure that offenders of the law are brought to justice.
Farah Hussain
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